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Hume: MDPS in Montana

COMMENT

MDPS IN MONTANA: IT'S THE END OF THE
WORLD AS WE KNOW IT... AND I FEEL FINE'
Taudd A. Hume*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past 20 years revenues of the legal profession in the
United States have grown at an astonishing rate: from $21
billion in 1979 to $125 billion in 1999.2 Although it may be an
uncouth suggestion, make no mistake about it, providing legal
services is big business. And as the legal "business" continues to
grow, other forces are at work on the practice of law. Consumers
question the cost of legal services, deciding whether to hire a
lawyer, act pro se, or find other alternatives. Corporations
continue to bring more work in-house. Insurance companies
place more limits on fees and costs for defense lawyers. And
nonlawyers increasingly seek entry into the practice of law.
1.

REM, It's The End of the World as We Know It (and I Feel Fine), on DOCUMENT

(Capital Records 1987).
* B.A. Whitworth College, 1994; expected J.D. University of Montana, 2002. I
would like to thank Julie Johnson for her editorial insights and sense of humor
regarding earlier drafts of this article.
2. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional GNP Data,
available at http://wwwbea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp/ (last visited May 2, 2002). The
legal industry in Montana has also grown at a staggering rate over that same time
period, from $54 million in 1979 to $192 million in 1999. Id.
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This trend includes the hiring of lawyers by other
professional services firms, such as accounting firms, 3 to create a
"multidisciplinary practice" (MDP).4 The desirability of the MDP
format is that it enables lawyers and non-lawyers to share fees
and profits in a professional entity that provides both legal and
non-legal services under one roof.5 This arrangement in turn
allows the MDP firm to cut costs and market itself in a more
efficient manner. However, current restrictions recognized by
the legal profession prohibit lawyers from sharing fees with nonlawyers in most types of professional partnerships. 6 Lawyers
working in professional services firms are providing services
that if provided by a lawyer in a traditional law firm setting,
would be considered the practice of law. These lawyers claim
that they are not practicing law, but rather are providing
"consulting" services for their clients. Professional services
firms employing these "consulting" lawyers are the subject of
growing concerns for bar regulators everywhere.
Virtually every state bar association across the country is

3. In the United States, Big Five accounting firms employ thousands of lawyers
practicing in the areas of tax, corporate, securities, employment, employee benefits and
other business-related areas. In 1999, a leading journal reported that excluding tax
lawyers,
6,362
lawyers
worked
for
Big
Five
accounting
firms
(PricewaterhouseCoopers/Landwell, Arthur Anderson, KPMG, Ernst & Young and
Deloitte & Touche). This journal integrated the statistics of the Big Five firms with the
statistics from traditional law firms; as a result the listing of the ten largest law firms
worldwide included three of the Big Five (showing PricewaterhouseCoopers ranked in
third place, Andersen ranked in fourth place and KPMG ranked in the seventh position).
Four of the Big Five ranked within the largest twenty law firms (indicating Ernst &
Young, in addition to the list of firms cited above). See IFLR1000 50 Largest Law Firms
in the World available at http://www.lawmoney.comhomepage/news/data/top50.asp (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002).
4. During the past 10 years the MDP movement has spread rapidly throughout
the world, with Big Five accounting firms providing legal services. In 1996, Arthur
Andersen acquired J&A Garrigues, one of Spain's leading law firms. Additionally,
accounting firms such as Arthur Andersen and Price Waterhouse have merged with law
firms throughout the British Isles, including the acquisition of Scotland's largest firm,
Dundas & Wilson. Big Five firms are major providers of legal services in Russia,
Eastern Europe, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Canada and a number of Latin
American and African countries. See Ward Bower, The Case for MDPs: Should
Multidisciplinary Practices Be Banned or Embraced?, LAw PRACTICE MANAGEMENT
MAGAZINE, Jul/Aug 1999, available at http://www.abanet.org/lpm/magazinemdpbowe995.html.
5. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Profession, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2000).
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983).
I say 'most types" of
partnerships because Rule 5.4 does list three exceptions to the rule. These exceptions
permit payment to a lawyer's estate, sale of a law practice, and participation of
nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan based on profit sharing. Id.
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currently studying the issue of Multidisciplinary Practices. 7 The
question being asked is whether changes in society require
changes in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that would
accommodate the MDP format. And specifically, whether Rule
5.4, which currently prohibits lawyers from sharing fees with
non-lawyers, should be amended.
Proponents of MDPs do not like the barriers of a traditional
law practice, arguing that if the legal profession is not able to
approach client needs in a packaged manner, the clients simply
will obtain it from other sources.8 The proponents say MDPs are
necessitated by rapid technological advances, the globalization
of capital and financial markets, and greater regulation of
commercial activity in this country and throughout the world. 9
Proponents see the push for MDPs as having gained
unstoppable momentum, and they seek to harmonize the legal
profession into the new economy while preserving its existing
ethical framework.' 0 Finally, supporters of the MDP format
suggest that ethical restrictions prohibiting a multidisciplinary
practice are relics of the early twentieth century, irrelevant to
today's economic reality, and ripe for change."
On the other side, opponents claim that the MDP
phenomenon poses a legitimate threat to the core values of the
legal
profession,
namely
loyalty,
confidentiality
and
independence. First, opponents fear that MDPs would destroy
the professional independence of attorneys, the responsibility to
make decisions in the best interest of the client, unconstrained
by any other interest.' 2 Second, opponents suggest that there is
no comparable duty of confidentiality in other professions, and
any partnership with nonlawyers could breakdown the

7. For a current list of state bar associations and their respective positions on the
issue of multidisciplinary practice see http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-state-action.html
(last visited May 2, 2002).
8. Robert A. Stein, MultidisciplinaryPractices:Prohibit or Regulate?, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1529, 1531 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1532. Some proponents also cite the existence of MDPs in European
countries. Any lengthy discussion of this topic is outside of the scope of this comment.
However, the New York State Bar conducted a survey of MDPs in selected jurisdictions
abroad. The survey concluded that any evaluation of the MDP experience in other
countries must take into account the differences (i.e. ethical rules and "core values")
between the legal profession in the United States and elsewhere. See New York State
Bar Report, 185 available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp-state-action.html (last
visited May 2, 2002).
12. Stein, supra note 8, at 1532.
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relationship of trust that must exist between lawyers and
clients. 13 And finally, opponents argue that the duty of loyalty
cannot be discharged adequately if an attorney is an employee of
a firm controlled by nonlawyers, who are not required to abide
by the same rules regarding conflict of interest as the legal
profession.' 4 Ultimately, these critics fear the erosion of ethical
standards necessary for the just and efficient practice of law.
This comment addresses the question of whether the
Montana Bar Association should vote to amend Rule 5.4 of the
Montana Rules of Professional Conduct to allow fee-sharing
arrangements necessitated by the multidisciplinary model.
Section II will discuss how the MDP proposal developed in the
United States. Section III will explore different practice forms
that an MDP could be modeled after. Section IV discusses the
two major structural challenges to adopting MDPs: the
prohibition on fee sharing found under Rule 5.4 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (including the tangential issues of
confidentiality and conflict of interest), and unauthorized
practice of law legislation. Section V provides analysis of
Montana's options for addressing the MDP issue. And Section VI
concludes by suggesting that the only viable option for Montana
is to draft and promulgate regulations for this emerging practice
form.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MDP PROPOSAL
In August 1998, then president of the American Bar
Association, Philip S. Anderson, appointed a twelve-person
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (ABA Commission) to
examine the MDP phenomenon.' 5 After several hearings held
13. Id. at 1533.
14. Id.
15. The Commission includes prominent lawyers, judges and academics to
represent a variety of backgrounds. The twelve members of the Commission are: Carl
Bradford, a state court judge in Portland, Maine; Paul Friedman, a U.S. District Court
judge in Washington, D.C.; Phoebe Haddon, a law professor at Temple Law School;
Geoffrey Hazard, a law professor at Pennsylvania Law School and former Executive
Director of the American Law Institute; Roberta Katz, CEO of the Technology Network;
Caroline Lamm, a lawyer at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney; Burnele Powell, Dean of
the University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School; Michael Traynor, a lawyer with
Cooley Godward in San Francisco; Herbert Wander, a lawyer with Katten Muchen &
Zavis in Chicago; and two ABA Board of Governors Liaisons: Joanne Garvey, a lawyer
with Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe in San Francisco; and Seth Rosner, of counsel to
Jacobs, Persinger & Parker in New York. See Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice,
Am. Bar Ass'n, Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and
Developments (1999) available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr.multicomreprotOll9.html
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around the country, the Commission issued its Report in July of
1999 concluding that MDPs should be permitted, subject to
certain restrictions. 16 In defense of its recommendation, the
Commission reasoned that since this phenomenon was already
occurring, state bar associations should embark upon an
approach of regulation rather than prohibition. 17 Subsequent to
8
its release, the Report was directed to the House of Delegates'
at the ABA's annual meeting in August, 1999. However, by the
end of the meeting the House had voted 2-1 in favor of a
resolution that recognized the need for further study regarding
the potential impact of MDPs on the profession's "core values."' 9
Adoption of MDPs seemed to be on hold for the time being.
The next official action came in March 2000, when the
Commission, after reviewing comments about its original
recommendation, issued a revised proposal. 20 The new proposal
reflected a more cautious approach by permitting MDPs only
where lawyers retain sufficient control and authority to assure
professional independence, and where lawyers are only engaged
with "members of recognized professions or other disciplines
that are governed by ethical standards." 2 ' As of the writing of
this comment, the ABA is still collecting feedback from its
recommendations and waiting further study and suggestion
(last visited May 2, 2002).
16. See generally Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Am. Bar Ass'n, Report
(1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html (last visited May 2, 2002)
In pertinent part, the Commission
[hereinafter MDP Commission Report].
recommended that the legal profession should: (1) maintain rules that protect its "core
values" (independence of professional judgment, confidentiality and loyalty); (2)
permitted lawyers and nonlawyers to share legal fees, subject to certain safeguards; and
(3) permit a lawyer to deliver legal services through a multidisciplinary practice, defined
as: a partnership, professional corporation or other association or entity that includes
lawyers and nonlawyers and has, as one but not all of its purposes, the delivery of legal
services to a client other than the MDP itself. See Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice,
available
at
1-3
(1999),
Bar
Ass'n,
Recommendations
Am.
(last visited May 2, 2002)
http:I/www.abanet.orglcpr/mdprecommendation.html
[hereinafter MDP Commission Recommendations].
17. See MDP Commission Report, supra note 16.
18. The House of Delegates is the policy-making body of the ABA, which has 530
delegates representing states, counties, ABA sections, and other affiliated organizations.
A. B. A. CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, RULES OF PROCEDURE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Art. 6
(1999-2000); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, POLICY AND PROCEDURE HANDBOOK 1 (1998-99).

19. Florida Bar Recommendation Before the House of Delegates, at the Am. Bar
at
(Aug.
10,
1999),
Meeting
in
Atlanta
Ass'n
Annual
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/flbarrec.html.
20. Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Am. Bar Ass'n, Draft Recommendation
(Mar. 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/marchrec.html.
21. Id. at Principle 1.
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from state bar committees around the country.
Virtually every state bar association has at least appointed
a committee to study and prepare recommendations regarding
the MDP issue. The reaction of these bar committees spans the
spectrum, ranging from New York's outright refusal to the
District of Columbia's virtual acceptance. 22 In Montana, the
Montana Bar Association has appointed a committee to study
the issue of multidisciplinary practices. 23 This committee has
neither
adopted
a
position
nor
promulgated
any
recommendations regarding the MDP issue. 24 To date there has
been little public discussion about the MDP format and its
25
potential impacts upon the practice of law in Montana.
III. FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE MDP MODEL
So what exactly is an MDP, and how would it function?
According to the ABA Commission, an MDP is one that includes
lawyers and other professionals in a single entity, providing a
range of services, including legal services, so that a client can
get all of its needs met under a single roof.26 Examples of MDPs
22. See Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Am. Bar Ass'n, Status of
Multidisciplinary Practice Studies By State, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpstateaction.html (last visited May 2, 2002).
23. The Montana Committee on Multidisciplinary Practice consists of 9 members:
4 lawyers, 4 nonlawyers, and a chairperson, with each position lasting for a term of three
years.
24. In Montana, both entry into the legal profession and the conduct of lawyers
once admitted, are regulated by the Montana Supreme Court. MONT CONST. art. VII, §
2(3). Therefore, it is the Supreme Court who will ultimately be responsible to adopt any
suggested modifications promulgated by the Montana Bar Association regarding the
Montana Rules of Professional Conduct.
25. The first major step in this process was to be a Continuing Legal Education
(CLE) seminar regarding multidisciplinary practices, which was to be held at Big Sky,
Montana, in July of 2000. This CLE was eventually cancelled due to lack of interest.
However, it should be noted that the Montana Bar Association Ethics Committee issued
an advisory opinion that forbids multidisciplinary practices under the current version of
Montana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4. State Bar of Mont. Ethics Comm.,

Advisory Op. 00011 (2000).
26. MDP Commission Report, supra note 16. The Commission defined an MDP
more precisely as:
a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that
includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes
the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that
holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal,
services.... It also includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins with
one or more other professional firms to provide services, including legal
services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the
arrangement. Whether a sustained - as opposed to sporadic or casual relationship between a lawyer and a nonlawyer for the delivery of legal and
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might include the following:
accounting firms hiring lawyers and providing legal services;
lawyers and chiropractors working together on behalf of persons
injured in traffic accidents; environmental consulting firms that
handle the entire range of environmental issues for a client,
including legal services; real estate development firms that
construct, manage and lease the completed structure, having
accountants, lawyers and other professionals on staff to provide
services in their respective fields; elder assistance firms that hire
accountants, social workers, lawyers and other professionals to
provide appropriate services; and financial planning firms that
financial planners to
hire securities dealers, lawyers, CPAs and
27
provide estate and trust planning services.

The ABA has developed a set of possible structural models
that the MDP form could take. 28 Those models include:
Model 1: The Cooperative ModelSp This model appeals to
the "leave it alone" crowd by maintaining the status quo. In this
model there would be no changes to Rule 5.4. Lawyers would be
free to employ nonlawyer professionals on their staffs to assist
them in advising clients. Lawyers could work with nonlawyer
professionals whom they directly retain or who are retained by
the client. However, any lawyer having supervisory control over
a nonlawyer would have to take steps "to ensure that the
person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations
30
of the lawyer," especially in the area of confidentiality.
Model 2: The Command and Control Model This model,
based on the amended version of Rule 5.4 adopted by the
District of Columbia, would permit a lawyer to form a
partnership with a nonlawyer and to share legal fees, subject to
certain restrictions. For example, such a law firm must have as
its sole purpose the provision of legal services to others; the
nonlawyer must agree to abide by the Rules of Professional
Conduct; the lawyers with a financial interest or managerial
authority are responsible for the nonlawyer participants; and
nonlegal services to a client may be considered an MDP will depend upon the
totality of the relevant facts and circumstances.

Id.
27. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Future of the Legal Profession, Report to the Board of
Governors (July 2001) available at http://www.wsba.org/2001/future/default.htm (last
visited May 2, 2002) [hereinafter Report to the Board of Governors].
28. These models were taken from: Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Am. Bar
at
available
Models,
and
Hypotheticals
Ass'n,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomhypos.html (last visited May 2, 2002).
29. This model reflects the status quo throughout the United States with the sole
exception of the District of Columbia.
30.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (1983).
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these conditions must be set forth in writing.
Model 3: The Ancillary Business Model Under this model a
law firm would operate an ancillary business that provides
professional services to clients. Here, the ancillary business
must conform its conduct to Rule 5.7,31 and must ensure that its
clients understand that the ancillary business is distinctly
separate from the law firm and does not offer legal services.
Lawyers provide "consulting services," not legal services, to the
clients of the ancillary business. In this model, lawyers and
nonlawyers are partners in the ancillary business, sharing fees,
sharing some clients, and jointly making management decisions
together.
Model 4: The Contract Model Under this model, a law firm
would remain independently controlled and managed by
lawyers, but would be free to contract for services with a
professional services firm. A contract could include items such
as: (1) the law firm agreeing to identify its affiliation with the
professional services firm on its letterhead and business cards,
and in its advertising; (2) the law firm and the professional
services firm agreeing to refer clients to each other on a
nonexclusive basis; and (3) the law firm agreeing to purchase
goods and services from the professional services firm such as
staff management, communications technology, and rent for the
leasing of office space and equipment.
Model 5: The Fully Integrated Model In this model, there is
a single professional services firm with organizational units,
such as accounting, business consulting, and legal services. The
legal services unit may represent clients who either retain its
services but not those of any other unit of the firm or retain its

31. Rule 5.7 provides that:
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with
respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if
the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's
provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with
others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a
person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the
separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the
client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term "law-related services" denotes services that might reasonably be
performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of
legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law
when provided by a nonlawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1983).
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services as well as the services of other units in the firm. In the
later case, the legal and nonlegal services may be provided in
connection with the same matter or different matters.
Proponents of a multidisciplinary partnership argue that
the efficiencies in "one-stop shopping" make Model 5 the
preferred model for multidisciplinary practice. 32 On the other
hand, opponents claim "the risk of disclosing confidential client
information, the danger of conflicts of interest, and the threat of
the loss of a lawyer's independent professional judgment are too
great," in the "Fully Integrated Model. '33 While opponents are
enthusiastic supporters of Model 1, both sides express varying
degrees of acceptance and reservation regarding Models 2
34
through 4.
IV.

STRUCTURAL RESTRICTIONS TO THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY

PRACTICE

Currently, two barriers prevent the practice of law in a
multidisciplinary setting: Rule 5.4 and Rule 5.5 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. First, Rule 5.4 strictly prohibits
fee sharing for fear that such an arrangement will have an
adverse effect on a lawyer's independent professional
judgment. 35 Additionally, any modification to Rule 5.4 may also
have tangential impacts on client confidentiality (Rule 1.6) and
conflicts of interest (Rule 1.7). Also implicated is Rule 5.5 and
its accompanying code sections, which forbid the unauthorized
practice of law. 36 A look at each of these barriers, along with
their historical developments, is necessary to understanding the
present context of the MDP debate in Montana.
A. The Prohibitionsof Rule 5.4
Should Montana decide to amend its current rules to permit
the MDP format, bar regulators will probably need to review all
of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct to see how they
apply in the MDP context. 37 However, at the core of the MDP

32.
Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
PurchasingLegal Services From Lawyers in a MultidisciplinaryPartnership,13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 217, 226 (2000).

33.
34.

Id.
Id.

35.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983).

36.
37.

Id. R. 5.5 (1983).
Appendix A to

the Commission's June

1999 Report contains possible
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debate is the concern over a lawyer's exercise of independent
professional judgment, found in Rule 5.4. 38
A lawyer's
professional independent judgment has always been strongly
guarded, with the underlying rationale being that splitting fees
with a nonlawyer could result in "control by a layperson,
interested in his own profit, rather than the client's fate." 39
It is interesting to note that the original Canons of
Professional Ethics, adopted by the ABA in 1908, barred neither
fee sharing or partnerships with nonlawyers. 40
These
prohibitions entered the rules with the adoption of Canons 33
through 35 in 1928. 41 When the ABA adopted the Code of

amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the event MDPs are
permitted. See Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Am. Bar Ass'n, Final Report Appendix A, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixa.html (last visited
May 2, 2002).
38. The full text of Rule 5.4 currently states:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except
that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate
may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time
after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified
persons; and
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled or
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to
the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon
purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole
or
in
part
on
a
profit-sharing
arrangement.
(b) a lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) a lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(d) a lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary
representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of
the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional
judgment of a lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983).
39. Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar, 86 Cal. Rptr. 367, 372 (Ct.
App. 3rd Dist. 1970). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 86-1519 (1986); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 87-355 (1987); State Bar of Mont. Ethics Comm., Op. 950411 (1995).
40. Daly, supra note 32, at 210.
41. Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/7

10

2002

MUL TIDISCIPLINARY
PRACTICE
Hume: MDPS in Montana

401

Professional Responsibility in 1969, Canons 33 through 35
remained unchanged. 42
The ABA claimed that these
prohibitions were necessary to ensure a lawyer's competence,
preserve independent profession judgment, and provide a
43
regulatory scheme that protected the public.
However, the 1969 Model Code soon came under widespread
criticism. In 1977, the ABA appointed the "Kutak Commission,"
named after its chairman Robert J. Kutak, to consider modifying
the Model Code."
The Kutak Commission presented a
Discussion Draft to the ABA's House of Delegates in January
1980 and a Proposed Final Draft in May 1981. 45 This time the
proposed draft of Rule 5.4 actually contained language that
would have permitted fee sharing arrangements, provided there
was no interference with a lawyer's independent professional
judgment.46 This was a radical departure from previous Model
Code provisions.4 7 So radical, in fact, that the ABA Section of
General Practice recommended an amendment which resulted in
the deletion of the new language entirely, restoring the
traditional prohibitions.4 8 Following considerable debate and
another round of revisions, the Model Rules of Professional

42. Id. at 241.
43. Id. at 242.
44. James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting At the Root of Core Values: A
"Radical Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84
MINN. L. REV., 1159,1193 (2000).
45. Id.
46. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
236 (1987) [hereinafter Legislative History]. The Kutak Commission recognized that this
type of practice arrangement could have implications on a lawyer's independent
professional judgment. However, the Commission reasoned that other rules already
adequately addressed this problem. For example, Rule 1.7 on conflicts of interest
requires complete loyalty to the client's interests, Rule 1.8(f) deals with situations in
which the lawyer is paid by a third party for his services, and Rule 1.2(a) confirms that
the client alone has final say as to the objectives of the representation. See Jones &
Manning, supra note 44, at 1159.
47.

See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-103(A) and DR 5-

107(B),(C)(1981).
48. See Legislative History, supra note 46, at 237. Proponents of that amendment
argued that the draft proposal represented a dangerous departure from existing law that
was neither constitutionally mandated nor warranted by the circumstances; and that
"nonlawyers, motivated by a desire for profit, would be unable to appreciate the ethical
considerations involved in representing a client, and further would not be subject to any
regulation or control." Id. The opponents of the amendment claimed that the proposed
rule was constitutionally sound, and that the involvement of a nonlawyer did not
presumptively interfere with a lawyers professional judgment. In their view, the effect
of the amendment "would be to limit the possibilities for formation of capital to sustain
the delivery of legal services." Id.
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Conduct were officially adopted by the ABA in 1983. 49 For
purposes of this comment the Montana Rules are essentially the
50
same as the Model Rules.
Currently, Rule 5.4 prohibits lawyers from sharing fees for
services with nonlawyers and prohibits a partnership with
nonlawyers where the activities of the partnership consist of the
practice of law.5 1
Rule 5.4 also prohibits a lawyer from
practicing law in an organization authorized to practice law for
profit if a nonlawyer owns an interest, is a corporate officer, or
has the right to direct the lawyer's professional judgment. 52 In
short, the current language of Rule 5.4 forbids the MDP format.
However, this could all change if Montana were to adopt the
recommendations promulgated by the ABA Commission. The
Commission has concluded that it is "consistent with the public
interest to permit lawyers to practice in MDPs provided that
there are adequate safeguards 53 in place to protect professional
54
independence of judgment."
49. Unlike the early versions of these rules found in the 1928 Canons, the
prohibitions found in the Model Rules were binding upon members of the bar. Comm'n
on Multidisciplinary Practice, Am. Bar Ass'n, Reporter's Notes: (1999), at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixc.html (last visited May 2, 2002) [hereinafter
Reporter's Notes].
50. Responding to a petition by the Montana State Bar Association, the Montana
Supreme Court adopted the Model Rules almost verbatim on June 6, 1985. Sup. Ct.
Order No. 84-303, June 6, 1985. Each state adopting the Rules interprets them
according to standard interpretation practices, but in the context of local practice
culture. In Montana, the State Bar Ethics Committee provides advisory interpretations
of the Rules to lawyers and proposes amendments to the Montana Supreme Court, which
has ultimate authority over the content of the Rules and their interpretation. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provide minimum standards, and are enforced by the
Commission on Practice of the Montana Supreme Court.
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983).
52. Id. at R. 5.4(d).
53. The Commission recommended that all rules of professional conduct applying
to a lawyer practicing in law firm should also apply to an MDP. See Reporter's Notes,
supra note 49. In terms of assuring that an MDP will comply with existing ethical
standards, the Commission suggested a system of annual certification and audit
provisions. In its annual certification, an MDP must acknowledge that "[i]t will respect
the unique role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the legal system, a representative
of clients and a public citizen having special responsibility for the administration of
justice." See MDP Commission Recommendation, supra note 16. Supporters of these
safeguards suggest that the "certification and audit provisions perform an educative
function, reminding both the lawyers and nonlawyer principals in an MDP of the
importance of those values and the need to be vigilant in establishing practices and
procedures to protect them. See Daly, supra note 32, at 279.
54. See MDP Commission Recommendation, supra note 16. The Commission
recommendation suggests that the current version of Rule 5.4 be amended to read:
Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with nonlawyer
professional in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal professional
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Proponents, in favor of allowing fee sharing arrangements,
note that in terms of the professional independence of lawyers,
there are many current settings in which lawyers work for
nonlawyer employers.
Those arrangements include lawyers
working as in-house counsel in corporate law departments and
government agencies, as well as lawyers representing individual
clients while employed by nonprofit legal services organizations
and prepaid legal insurance plans. 55 Professor Robert Gordon
summarized the proponents position in his comments to the
MDP Commission in the following manner:
Any and all forms of professional practice are subject to pressures,
constraints and temptations - pressures from hierarchical
superiors or peers, payment systems or fee arrangements,
incentives to career advancement or financial reward inside firms
or in the profession generally - that may to a greater or lesser
extent compromise the exercise of a lawyer's independent
judgment. Over the course of this century, the legal profession has
adopted many arrangement and organizational forms for
representing clients and receiving payment for services that pose
conflicts between their own interests on the one hand and the
interests of clients and the public good on the other. Hourly
billing, to take one of many examples, tempts some lawyers to run
the meter, churn cases, and pad bills; contingent fees, to take
another, tempts others to shirk on effort, and settle early and low.
Such conflicts are unavoidable: No set of arrangements has ever
been or ever will be devised that will entirely remove such
pressures and temptations. The question [the] Commission has to
ask is, "Do the proposed arrangements for lawyers to practice with
non-lawyers promise to add any significant sources of pressure,
56
constraint and temptation to those that already exist?"

services (Multidisciplinary Practice), provided that the lawyers have the
control and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in the
rendering of legal services. "Nonlawyer professionals" means members of
recognized professions or other disciplines that are governed by ethical
standards.
Id. at Recommendation 1.
55. Jones & Manning, supra note 44, at 1197. Critics have suggested that "by
arbitrarily permitting certain types of affiliations between lawyers and nonlawyers while
condemning others, the current Rule 5.4 creates the strong impression that its primary
purpose is not the preservation of independent judgment but rather the selfish
protection of lawyers' economic interests." Id. at 1205. The Kutak Commission
specifically criticized the ban on fee splitting as "only tenuously related to substantial
ethical concerns [about lawyer-nonlawyer] relationships," denounced it as "economic
protectionism" for traditional legal service organizations and condemned it for
"imped[ing] development of new methods of providing legal services." Daly, supra note
32, at 242.
56. Letter from Robert W. Gordon, Fred A. Johnston Professor of Law at Yale Law
School, to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (May 21, 1999),
at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/gordon.html.
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Ultimately, proponents suggest, the consequence of the
current rule has been to create a situation in which thousands of
lawyers now work in consulting firms, investment banking
houses, accounting firms, and elsewhere, applying their skills
and offering advice to clients completely outside the structure of
57
the legal profession and outside the reach of the rules of ethics.
On the other hand, opponents of the Commission's
recommendations argue that anything tending to undermine
lawyer independence is a threat to the entire system of justice,
because that system depends to such a high degree upon
voluntary compliance with an independent lawyer who has an
ethical duty to uphold the law. 58 A lawyer must have undivided
loyalty to his or her client, and must be free from outside
influences. By allowing nonlawyers to have direction or control
over a lawyer, the lawyer's clients become subject to the
economic influences of members of professions that do not share
the core values of the legal profession. 59 In addition, opponents
contend that all of the benefits of engaging multiple disciplines
in providing legal services can be obtained without the need to
jeopardize the core values of the legal profession. 60 Lawyers can,
and do, currently specialize in particular areas of the law, and
retain or associate with accountants, engineers or other
professionals to provide a multidisciplinary approach to problem
61
solving.
In short, opponents argue that MDP supporters have failed
to explain why "business conditions" should dictate the
elimination of ethical rules designed to protect clients by
minimizing conflicts of interest. It should be the other way
around, they suggest; legal ethics rules are designed to limit the
business side of law so that it remains predominantly a
62
profession dedicated to the public interest.
1.

MaintainingConfidentiality of Information in an MDP

Also implicated in the MDP debate is Rule 1.6 regarding
confidentiality of information. Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Jones & Manning, supra note 44, at 1205.
See Report to the Board of Governors, supra note 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless
the client consents
after consultation. 63
The
accompanying Comments to Rule 1.6 assert that confidentiality
"facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client" and "encourages people to seek
64
early assistance."
In a traditional law firm setting, the law assumes that
absent client direction to the contrary, one lawyer in the firm
may share information with other lawyers and nonlawyers in
the law firm. 65 However, opponents of the MDP format argue
that there is no comparable duty of confidentiality in other
professions. This lack of a duty would therefore compromise the
relationship of trust necessary to promote full disclosure and
63. The full text of Rule 1.6 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of a lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.6 (1983). Rule 1.6 defined confidentiality much
more broadly than had the predecessor Model Code and avoided the terms "secrets" and
"confidences." See Legislative History, supra note 46, at 51.
64.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (1983). The Supreme Court in

Upjohn Co. v. United States,449 U.S. 383 (1981) stated that:
[ilts purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or
advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.
Id. at 389. For a discussion on the origins and historical developments of the rule of
confidentiality see generally James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REV. 279 (1963); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., A HistoricalPerspective on
the Attorney-Client Privilege,66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
65.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. g

(1996). The duty to maintain confidentiality also extends to nonlawyer assistants and
employees of the lawyer. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal
Op. 88-1525 (1988); see also Pennsylvania v. Mrozek, 657 A.2d 997 (Pa. 1995); Ohio v.
McDermott, 651 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1995). It is the lawyer who must oversee nonlawyer
employees to ensure confidentiality or be subject to discipline for any disclosure of
information. See Accord Me. Bd. of Overseers to the Bar, Professional Ethics Comm'n,
Op. 134 (Jan. 21, 1993).
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complete development of the facts. 66
An example close to the heart of the accounting profession
involves the traditional audit function. The public expects that
the auditor is under a duty to disclose problems and
discrepancies discovered in the audit with no duty of
confidentiality to the client. Lawyers, on the other hand, are
perceived by the public to be under a duty not to disclose
67
problems or matters harmful to the client.
Consider the example of Arthur Andersen's involvement
with the energy giant Enron.
Former Chairman of the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Sherwin P. Simmons,
recently stated that Enron "emphasizes the importance of
separating the consulting [including legal] from the audit
function. '68 Simmons predicted that the Enron crisis will add a
new sense of urgency to the MDP debate by asserting that
"Ia]ny state which changes its rules to permit MDPs will
certainly want to take another look at the provisions permitting
the structuring of legal services with audit services, which is a
real, major problem." 69 Illustratively, since the Enron scandal
many of Andersen's clients have left the accounting giant feeling
70
unable to trust its independent advice.
The Commission, however, is persuaded that confidentiality
of client information can be maintained in an MDP. The
Committee's recommendations in this area call for lawyers to be
diligent in alerting a client to the difference between protected
communications with a lawyer and potentially unprotected
communications with a nonlawyer. 7 1 Moreover, the Commission
66.
Stein, supra note 8, at 1533. For example, if a lawyer working in an MDP
receives information from a client, the lawyer is duty bound not to disclose that
information without the client's permission. However, if a social service professional,
working in that same MDP, learns from a client of the abuse of a child, that professional
has an obligation to disclose this information to government authorities.
67. Id. The Commission recognizes that inconsistencies exist with regard to this
particular disclosure function.
See MDP Commission Report, supra note 16.
Additionally, even when the accountant is not performing "audit" functions, or does not
have an affirmative obligation of disclosure, his knowledge about the client's affairs is
discoverable. See Alabama State Bar's MDP Task Force, Proposed Report to the Board
of Bar Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar by the Multidisciplinary Practice Task
Force,
Con
Subcommittee
(June
2000),
available
at
http://www.alabar.org/page.cfm?view=74&DoclD=805.
68. Geanne Rosenberg, The Enron Implosion: Scandal Seen As Blow To Outlook
For MDP, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at Al.
69. Id.
70. See e.g., Janice Revell, Fight And Flight At Andersen, FORTUNE, Apr. 1, 2002,
at 29, 30.
71. See MDP Commission Report, supra note 16. To address concerns related to
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believes that "careful instruction about the obligation of
confidentiality by a lawyer in an MDP to nonlawyers who are
assisting the lawyer in the delivery of legal services will
adequately protect the interests of clients." 72 MDP proponents
suggest that this careful policy of disclosure is adequate to
73
protect a client's expectations of confidentiality.
2. ProtectingAgainst Conflicts of Interest in an MDP
The safeguards to conflicts of interest also come into
question under the MDP proposal.
Under the Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7 requires that an attorney not
have a conflict of interest with regard to the client, unless the
client consents to the conflict after consultation. 74 This duty of
loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a
client, 75 and can be impaired when a lawyer cannot consider,
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the
client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or

the protection of confidential client information, the Commission suggests that:
[1]anguage [should] be included in the Comment to the amended Model Rule
5.4 emphasizing the need for a lawyer in an MDP to take measures to clarify
the layer's position within the MDP, the lawyer's relationship with the MDP's
clients, and the obligation of the MDP to protect client and public interests.
The measure should include informing clients concerning the lawyer's function
as a provider of legal services and the likelihood that the client's
communications with nonlawyers in the MDP that rare unrelated to the
provision of legal services would not be protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
Id.
72. See Reporter's Notes, supra note 49.
73. Stein, supra note 8, at 1543.
74. The full text of Rule 1.7 provides that:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyers own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983).
75. Id. at cmt. 1.
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interests.7 6
The Committee's recommendation in this area maintains
the status quo by providing that "all clients of an MDP should be
treated as the lawyer's clients for purposes of conflict of interest
and imputation in the same manner as if the MDP were a law
firm and all employees, partners, shareholders or the like were
lawyers. '77 In addition, the Committee recommends that an
MDP be governed by the same Model Rules of Professional
Conduct as a law firm with regard to the imputation of conflicts
78
and permissible screening measures.
Opponents, however, argue that the duty of loyalty cannot
be discharged adequately if an attorney is an employee of a firm
controlled by nonlawyers and that firm is not required to abide
by the same rules regarding conflict of interest as the legal
profession. 79 At its core, this issue is also about the independent
professional judgment of a lawyer. Conflict of interest interferes
with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives, and forecloses courses of action that
80
reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.
B. Protecting The Public From Unqualified Counsel
From a historical perspective, the prohibitions against fee
sharing are inextricably linked with the adoption and
enforcement of unauthorized practice of law legislation in the
United States. 8 ' Understanding this history is imperative to
appreciating the present state of UPL enforcement in the United
States and Montana.
By the early years of the twentieth century the concerns of
the organized bar had turned "to ward off incursion by title
insurance companies, credit and collection agencies, banks and
trust companies, accountants, automobile clubs, mortgage and
insurance companies, and lay representatives seeking to appear
before administrative agencies."8 2 With the expressed rationale

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at cmt. 4.
See MDP Commission Report, supra note 16.
Id.
Stein, supra note 8, at 1532.

80.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (1983).

81. Reporter's Notes, supra note 49.
82. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 112 (1989). It is interesting to note that
the rhetoric emanating from the courts during this time period sounds conspicuously
familiar to the current MDP debate. For example, a New York court, fearful of corporate
aggression into the practice of law, stated that:
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being that the public will be harmed by untrained and
unqualified individuals providing "legal" services,8 3 local and
regional bar associations employed a number of methods in
seeking to stop lay competitors from "practicing law." In some
cases, bar regulators sought legislation to define the lawyer's
monopoly as broadly as possible.8 4 This happened with greater
occurrence during the Great Depression as the legal profession
85
sought exclusive rights to income-producing work.
In other instances, bar associations negotiated agreements
86
with competing occupations that divided contested markets.
Beginning in 1937, the ABA and various state and local bar
associations entered into formal "Statements of Principles" with
competing professions, including accountants, architects,
bankers, claims adjusters, collection agents, engineers, social
87
workers, law book publishers, realtors, and insurance brokers.
Each year 10 to 20 representatives of the bar and the businesses
involved met to amend their agreements and consider
complaints of violations.88 By maintaining these agreements,
bar associations hoped to "ensure better public relations for all
concerned," as well as increase efficiency in "serving the
Ultimately, however, pressure from the Justice
public."8 9
many bar
Antitrust Division prompted
Department's
The corporation would control the litigation, the money earned would belong to
the corporation, and the attorney would be responsible to the corporation only.
His master would not be the client but the corporation, conducted it may be
wholly by laymen, organized simply to make money and not to aid in the
administration of justice which is the highest function of an attorney and
counselor at law. The corporation might not have a lawyer among its
stockholders, directors, or officers. Its members might be without character,
learning or standing. There would be no remedy by attachment or disbarment
to protect the public from imposition or fraud, no stimulus to good conduct from
the traditions of an ancient and honorable profession, and no guide except the
The bar, which is an
sordid purpose to earn money for stockholders.
institution of the highest usefulness and standing, would be degraded if even
its humblest member became subject to the orders of a money-making
corporation engaged not in conducting litigation for itself, but in the business
of conducting litigation for others. The degradation of the bar is an injury to
the state.
In re Coop. Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910).
83. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 829 (1986).
84. Jones & Manning, supra note 44, at 1171.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Deborah L. Rhode, Policing The Professional Monopoly: A Constitutionaland
EmpiricalAnalysis of UnauthorizedPracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1981).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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associations to rescind their formal statements of principles. 90
During this same time period, the bar also embarked on an
aggressive effort to prosecute lay competitors for the
unauthorized practice of law. 91 In 1914 the New York County
Lawyers Association appointed the first committee on
unauthorized practice, which soon brought a series of cases
92
against corporations, including title and trust companies.
Following New York's lead, the ABA established its first
Committee on Unauthorized Practice in 1930; and by 1938 over
400 state and local bar associations had established similar
committees, with educational, investigative, and enforcement
responsibilities. 93
Over the years, bar associations have
typically been concerned with corporations and laymen
attempting to practice law without a license. Examples of these
attempts include: real estate brokers who draw up documents in
property transfers; individuals or organizations selling do-ityourself kits; and lay involvement in insurance, debt collection,
94
bankruptcy, immigration, and trust or probate matters.
However, UPL enforcement proved to be terribly difficult
due to the seeming impossibility of defining what constitutes the
"practice of law." 95 The position of both the 1969 Code and the
1983 Model Rules is that no uniform definition is desirable, and
96
that each jurisdiction is free to determine its own limits.
Definitional ambiguity seemed to be a common problem among
most American jurisdictions.
Montana has also encountered problems with UPL
enforcement.
In the 1980s, the Montana Supreme Court
established the Commission on Unauthorized Practice to
examine UPL claims. However, the Commission, which also
suffered from an overly vague definition of the "practice of
law,"97 had no operating budget to investigate or prosecute

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 10.
Jones & Manning, supra note 44, at 1171.
Rhode, supra note 87, at 9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
Daly, supra note 32, at 250.

96. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 n.2 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 1 (1983).

97. In Montana the "practice of law" is defined as:
Any person who shall hold himself out or advertise as an attorney or counselor
at law or who shall appear in any court of record or before a judicial body,
referee, commissioner, or other officer appointed to determine any question of
law or fact by a court or who shall engage in the business and duties and
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complaints, 98 and operated under a statute that contained
relatively minor penalties for offenders.9 9 During this time
period, UPL enforcement proceeded in haphazard fashion,
entities
over individual
usually favoring sophisticated
laypersons. For example, while the Montana Supreme Court
declared recurring lay representation in courts of limited
jurisdiction to be unauthorized practice of law, 100 it found that a
bank's preparation of deed of trust and mortgage instruments,
not to be a violation of the statute. 1 1 In terms of a systematic
approach to unauthorized practice, critics declared the law to be
perform such acts, matters, and things as are usually done or performed by an
attorney at law in the practice of his profession.., shall be deemed practicing
law.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-201 (2001). States adopting the MDP proposal may find it
necessary to amend their statutory definition of what constitutes the "practice of law."
Therefore, based on District of Columbia Court Rule 49, the Commission suggested the
following definition in Appendix A of its Report:
'Practice of Law" means the provision of professional legal advice or services
where there is a client relationship of trust or reliance. One is presumed to be
practicing law when engaging in any of the following conduct on behalf of
another:
(a) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages,
assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other
instruments intended to affect interests in real or personal property, wills,
codicils, instruments intended to affect the disposition of property of
decedents' estates, documents relating to business and corporate
transactions, other instruments intended to affect or secure legal rights,
and contracts except routine agreements incidental to a regular course of
business;
(b) Preparing or expressing legal opinion;
(c) Appearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal;
(d) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or any
written documents containing legal argument or interpretation of law, for
filing in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal;
(e) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities described in
subparagraph (a) through (d) might be done, or whether they were done,
in accordance with applicable law;
(f) Furnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons, to render the
services described in subparagraphs (a) through (e) above.
Appendix A, supra note 37.
98. See Sally K. Hilander, New Commission Opens The File On Unauthorized
Practice,MONT. LAW., Dec. 1998, at 1.
99. Hon. Douglas G. Harkin, Letters To The Editor: Unauthorized Practice Casts
Shadow On Legal Profession, MONT. LAW., June 1997, at 10. The only remedy available
for unauthorized practice was, and still is, in the form of an injunction from the court. If
the injunction was ignored, the defendant could then be prosecuted under contempt of
court. Mont. Code Ann. § 37-61-210 (2001).
100. Sparks v. Johnson, 252 Mont. 39, 42, 826 P.2d 928, 930 (1992).
101. Pulse v. N. Am. Land Title Co. of Mont., 218 Mont. 275, 282, 707 P.2d 1105,
1109-1110 (1985).
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"unenforceable" and "without teeth."1 °2
The Commission
ultimately dissolved as the terms of its members expired.
Recognizing the need to address unauthorized practice in a
more efficient and thorough manner, the Montana Supreme
Court appointed a new Commission in the summer of 1998.103
The new Commission began receiving about $6,000 in annual
operating expenses from the Montana Bar Association.
However, the efforts of the new commission have also been
seriously hampered by the same vague definition of the practice
of law and relatively insufficient penalties for enforcement.
Since its appointment, it too has largely failed to provide an
organized and systematic regulatory approach to the
unauthorized practice of law in Montana.
V. ANALYSIS: ABSTENTION, PROSECUTION OR REGULATION?
The Montana Bar Association is currently at a crossroads.
After undertaking study of the MDP issue, the Association has
three choices: do nothing, in which event external forces will
become the sole determinants; enforce current regulations ( i.e.
UPL statutes) to try and stop the MDP onslaught; or amend the
current rules to allow for regulation of lawyers practicing in the
MDP format (implicit in these options is the assumption that
lawyers are already practicing in the MDP environment
throughout the country, and will continue to do so unless
otherwise stopped).
One option the Montana Bar Association has before it is to
simply ignore the MDP phenomena. However, collectively
putting our heads in the sand will not address the problem. At
the heart of the MDP issue is the very real and immediate
threat of a separate "caste" of lawyers operating in
multidisciplinary environments outside the purview of existing
ethical standards. 10 4 If regulators choose to ignore MDPs,
lawyers operating in these environments will continue to ignore
the ethical rules, which will "breed disrespect for the law and
legal ethics rules, and it may create a race to the bottom" to gain
a competitive advantage. 105 Continuing to ignore the MDP

102. Sally K. Hilander, Fake Lawyers: UnauthorizedPractice Issue Is Coming To A
Head, MONT. LAW., May 1997, at 3, 6.
103. Harkin, supra note 99.
104. Laurel S. Terry, A Primer On MDPs: Should The "No" Rule Become A New
Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 920 (1999).
105. Id.
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phenomena poses a harmful situation to the legal profession, the
10 6
rules that regulate it, and the public at large.
Another option for Montana would be to increase
enforcement of UPL legislation in order to contain, and
ultimately stop, the growth of MDPs. Critics of the MDP
proposal suggest that should states adopt the practice model,
07
nonlawyers would be "practicing law" at unprecedented rates,
exposing the public to the harms of unqualified, nonlawyer
practitioners. 0 8
However, Professor Charles Wolfram has
articulated that in order to be persuasive, the "public harm"
rationale must demonstrate two core propositions.
First, it would be necessary to demonstrate that lawyers under an
unauthorized practice system are on average significantly more
protective of client interests than nonlawyer practitioners would
be in the absence of unauthorized practice rules. Second, it is
necessary to demonstrate that in fact potential clients would be
worse off without unauthorized practice protection. 10 9

Carrying this argument to the current debate, opponents of
the MDP proposal are hard-pressed to submit evidence
suggesting that a client would be better served by a lawyer than
by a nonlawyer professional, in many MDP practice areas.
Additionally, judges are not sympathetic to UPL claims when
there is no evidence of client harm. 1 0 And regulation of any
unauthorized practice that is not harming the public may be

106. Additionally, consider the effect that MDPs might have on Montana's small
and mid-sized law firms (which account for a vast majority of practitioners in the state).
Even today, small and mid-sized firms are under pressure from larger statewide,
regional or national firms, making it difficult for them to keep larger institutional
clients. See Norman K. Clark, Multidisciplinary Practice: What will it Mean for the
Smaller Firm?, Wis. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 20. MDPs will prove to be more formidable
competitors, with their ability to cost-effectively address complex, multidisciplinary
issues. Small and mid-sized firms should be allowed the opportunity to prepare
themselves in like manner for this situation. Id. To do nothing about this possibility may
prove fatal.
107. Reporter's Notes, supra note 49.
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 1 (1983).
109. WOLFRAM, supra note 83, at 829. Professor Wolfram provides the following
example by stating:
In other words, even if one can safely assume that a purchaser of residential
real estate is more competently represented by a graduate of a prestigious law
school with years of experience and fee rates to match, one is still entitled to
inquire whether the purchaser would be worse off if form documents used for a
purchase agreement were filled out in the purchaser's behalf by a real estate
agent with a high-school diploma who specializes in purchases of residential
real estate and whose employer charges nothing extra for the document work.
Id.
110. Terry, supra note 104, at 921.
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viewed as turf protection on behalf of the legal profession,
leading to eventual action by the legislature.1 11
It is important to draw the distinction between accountants
and other professionals assisting lawyers in the "practice of
law," and a nonlawyer who independently holds himself out to
1 12
be a lawyer. Clearly, the latter possesses cause for concern.
Jim Hunt, Chair of the Montana Commission on Unauthorized
Practice, has stated that attempting to bar entities whose
services touch on the law would be a "practical morass and a
political nightmare" and might not be necessary to protect the
public. 113 The real problem is with the nonlawyer "who sets up
shop in his garage and advertises that he does divorce work."11 4
These comments not only support the proposition that clients
will not likely be harmed by other professionals, but they also
give insight into how far regulators are willing, or able, to
prosecute UPL legislation in Montana.
An additional problem with the enforcement of Montana's
UPL statute is the vague definition of what constitutes the
"practice of law." Montana's current definition prohibits a
nonlawyer from (a) holding out or advertising as an attorney, (b)
appearing in a judicial proceeding, or (c) engaging in duties
"usually done or performed by an attorney." 115 However, rather
than defining the "practice of law" in an inclusive sense, the
definition attempts to exclude nonlawyers from performing the
tasks of a lawyer, without enunciating what those tasks are.
Consequently, even if regulators in Montana were motivated to
stop UPL violations, pursuing individuals or corporations under
this definition would be practically useless.
Therefore, if it is dangerous to ignore the MDP issue, and
infeasible to try and stop its progression, the only other
111.
This scenario, of course, draws its own set of constitutional issues (separation
of powers), which are well beyond the scope of this comment.
112. Consider the example of a Helena couple who pleaded guilty in 1997 to charges
of posing as lawyers. The couple, who called their business the McCleod Law Firm,
were alleged to have bilked numerous "clients" out of a total of about $250,000. See
Hilander, supra note 103, at 5.
113. Hilander, supra note 98, at 25. It is interesting to note that UPL enforcement
against large accounting and consulting firms has proven to be unsuccessful. In one of
the rare investigations of a Big Five accounting firm in recent years, the Texas
unauthorized practice of law committee concluded, after an expensive eleven-month
investigation, that it would not file a complaint against Arthur Andersen. And in 1999,
the State of Virginia reached the same conclusion with respect to compliance law
services offered by a professional services firm. See Stein, supra note 8, at 1535.
114. Hilander, supra note 98, at 25.
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-201 (2001).
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alternative, pragmatic as it may be, is to provide a regulatory
The Montana Bar
structure to influence its direction.
Association and the Montana Supreme Court should amend
Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, to allow
lawyers and nonlawyers to share fees for services. Regulation is
not only in the best interest of the legal services consumer, but
116
also the legal profession.
It is the legal profession's duty to act in the public's interest.
The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations
are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of
the self-interested concerns of the bar. 117 As evidenced by the
increased use of pre-paid legal service plans, pro se
representation, and now the demand for multidisciplinary
practices, the American consumer is looking for new and more
cost efficient ways to obtain legal services. Permitting the MDP
format will allow consumers the choice of services they wish to
receive, thus acting as a marketplace regulator. The Consumer
Alliance submitted a statement to the ABA's MDP Commission,
which provided:
In most products or services they buy, consumers want choices.

Choice is the backbone of America's free enterprise, competitive
business community. By allowing lawyers to partner with other
types of professionals, every consumer could choose the method of
service that best suits his or her needs. Not every consumer will
want to consult a multidisciplinary practice that includes a lawyer
- but all consumers would benefit from having that option and we
believe that lawyers will benefit as well. 118
Equally as important, acting to regulate MDPs will be in
the best interest of the legal profession. By subjecting each
individual lawyer to the same ethical rules, regardless of the
practice setting in which the lawyer is employed, regulation will
ensure the level of consistency and quality that has become the
hallmark of the legal profession. 119

116. After hearing extensive testimony from lawyers and interest groups across the
country the ABA's Multidisciplinary Practice Committee concluded that MDPs are not
only in high demand by the consumer, but are in the best interest of the public. See
Reporter's Notes, supra note 49.
117. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble (1983).
118. The Consumer Alliance, Written Remarks to the MDP Commission, available
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicom.html (last visited May 2, 2002).
119. Melinda Merk & Patrick Schmidt, Written Remarks to the MDP Commission,
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/yld.html (last visited May 2, 2002).
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VI. CONCLUSION

For centuries, the practice of law has been considered a
"profession". The word "profession" implies a commitment to
preserve the public good. It is part of a lawyers job to "be
directly concerned with the public good - with the integrity of
the legal system, with the fairness of its rules and their
administration, with the health and well-being of the
community that the laws in part establish and in part aspire to
create.' 120 To understand this calling is also to understand that
one who practices law does so only within the larger theoretical
framework of legal traditions, and the values that have formed
them. To practice law is to "come into an activity with selfconscious historical depth, to feel that one is entering an activity
that has long been under way, and whose fulfillment requires a
collaboration among many generations." 121 Considering this
view, it is important to realize that the legal profession has
evolved throughout its history to meet the changing needs of the
public. 122
Examples of such adaptation include the emergence of the
corporate lawyer, the creation of modern law firms, the
introduction of associates, the development of in-house corporate
law departments, the expansion of key roles for lawyers in
government service, the introduction of group legal services plans,
the evolution of highly specialized practices, the recent explosive
growth of the "mega-firms," the creation of new categories of
employees like paralegals to assist in the delivery of legal services,
and the expansion of multidisciplinary approaches to client
problems through the widespread use of nonlawyer experts and
23
the establishment of ancillary businesses. 1

It is, therefore, inevitable that the profession will continue
to adapt and change as the "demands of society force the
creation of new forms of practice and the evolution of new
methods for delivering legal services." 124 Today the profession
again faces a challenge that promises to forever alter the
landscape of legal service delivery. Multidisciplinary practice is
an idea that has generated both enthusiastic support and
fervent opposition. However, it is important to realize that
MDPs are with us to stay, with or without the blessing of the

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

DEBORAH L. RHODE, ETHICS IN PRACTICE 31-32 (2000).
Id. at 34.
Jones & Manning, supra note 44, at 1210.
Id.
Id.
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bar. Whether one sees the MDP movement as the natural
progression of a complex profession operating in an increasingly
interdependent world, or a vicious attack on the regulatory
backbone of an ordered society, it must be dealt with. Seemingly,
the bar lacks the resources, political will, and statutory clarity
necessary to increase UPL enforcement against nonlawyers
whose professions brush against the practice of law.
Recognizing this reality, the bar association has the opportunity
to help shape the new legal frontier by working with, not
against, the agents of change.
The regulation of MDPs will ensure that all lawyers,
regardless of their practice setting, submit to the same ethical
obligations and standards.
By ensuring this uniformity,
Montana's legal community will be fulfilling its commitment to
protect the public interest, while simultaneously maintaining
the integrity of its ethical heritage. MDPs may be the end of the
world as we know it... and I feel fine.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2002

27

Montana Law Review, Vol. 63 [2002], Iss. 2, Art. 7

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/7

28

